Campbell Law Review
Volume 36
Issue 1 Fall 2013

Article 5

2014

How to Make Lemonade from Lemons: Achieving
Better Free Speech Protection Without Altering the
Existing Legal Protection for Censorship in
Cyberspace
Gil'ad Idisis

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Recommended Citation
Gil'ad Idisis, How to Make Lemonade from Lemons: Achieving Better Free Speech Protection Without Altering the Existing Legal Protection
for Censorship in Cyberspace, 36 Campbell L. Rev. 147 (2013).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.

5. IDISIS_FINAL

1/17/2014 6:04 PM

Idisis: How to Make Lemonade from Lemons: Achieving Better Free Speech Pr

How to Make Lemonade from Lemons:
Achieving Better Free Speech Protection
Without Altering the Existing Legal Protection
for Censorship in Cyberspace
GIL’AD IDISIS
INTRODUCTION
The Internet is considered to be one of the most, if not the most,
important evolutionary steps in the advancement of freedom of speech
in modern history. It has been referred to by at least one United States
court as “the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed.”1
The Internet allows anyone, for the small price of owning a computer,
smartphone, or tablet, to have full and unlimited access to a platform
granting, in theory at least, access to an audience of millions of people
around the world. As part of this cyber community, people can freely
exchange information and ideas.
This great potential also brought with it great concerns, as the
hazards that existed in allowing free speech––such as expression of
defamation, hate speech, incitement to violence, and distribution of
misinformation and materials that are sensitive to national security—
were amplified and multiplied exponentially. With the click of a mouse
or a few taps on a keyboard, anyone can “poison the well” and generate
grave, virtually irreparable damages.
Congress, already aware of these dangers in the mid-1990s, made
various legislative attempts to restrict and control content on the
Internet, mostly in relation to protecting minors from harmful content.2
1. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
2. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661, 673 (2004) (holding that the
Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which criminalized commercial Internet postings
that were harmful to minors without prior age verification, was unconstitutional for
being over-extensive in comparison with other, less restrictive options, such as the use of
filters). See also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849, 859 (1997) (striking down the
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) that criminalized the knowing
transmission of “obscene or indecent” messages to minors). Justice Stevens, writing for
the Court, stated:
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In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court struck down such
attempts as violations of the First Amendment.3 In such cases, the
Supreme Court emphasized time and time again that it would examine
such legislation with strict scrutiny.4
This in turn led Congress to attempt to privatize content-regulation
through legislation that allows and motivates the private sector, i.e.,
Internet service providers (ISPs), to freely regulate Internet content as
they see fit.5 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA),
entitled “Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive
material,” provides ISPs with almost full immunity from liability in the
decisions they make regarding whether or not to censor user content.6
Among the underlying policies of section 230(b), Congress listed: to
promote the Internet and interactive media, to preserve the free market
for the Internet and media services, and to promote the development of
technologies for content filtering by the user.7 While the goal of
incentivizing direct content regulation, rather than developing filtering
tools to be controlled by the user, is not explicitly mentioned as part of
the declared policies, it is clearly an objective. At the very least, it is a
welcomed side effect from the broad immunity granted to ISPs by
section 230, specifically subsection (c)(2).8
This leads to the question of whether the policies listed in section
230 are indeed advanced in the most optimal way and at what cost for
free speech.9 If the answer is no, the policies are not advanced in the
most optimal way, this in turn leads to another question: What can be
done in order to strike a balance between effective regulation against

We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment
requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny
minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a
large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to
address to one another.
Id. at 874.
3. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 661, 673; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 849,
859.
4. Nicholas P. Dickerson, Comment, What Makes the Internet So Special? And Why,
Where, How, and By Whom Should its Content be Regulated?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 61, 78–79
(2009).
5. See Communications Decency Act 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
6. See id. § 230(c) (providing “protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and
screening of offensive material”).
7. Id. § 230(b).
8. Id. § 230(c)(2).
9. See id. § 230(b).
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harmful content and protection of free speech on the Internet that is
threatened by such regulation?
This Article will explain why governmental regulation is the worst
possible alternative and why private regulation is the best alternative, if
not the only possible way, to ensure effective content regulation.
However, unfettered private regulation, absent an array of checks and
balances, gives too much power to entities that do not possess sufficient
incentives to adequately protect free speech—free speech the public
needs to preserve and advance.
While this Article restricts its main theme and its conclusion to the
issues regarding privatized content control, it does raise a far broader
issue: Whether the existing territorial, institutional legal framework is an
effective forum to regulate cyberspace. As described in Part E of this
Article, the regular “old world” system is struggling to offer effective
remedies that are needed to resolve Internet-based disputes. Such
disputes often have characteristics that make them insolvable, which are
especially due to the nature of the judicial system. For example, issues
are often international in nature or pose a question that is too urgent for
a court to effectively solve. Often, there are cost-benefit issues for
private users that prevent them from even seeking a remedy to their
injury. All of these concerns are embodied in cases of wrongful
censorship, but these concerns also exist in nearly every other aspect of
cyberspace. As such, the problem of censorship is a remarkable test case
to examine such issues and to try to offer a better solution.
As a preliminary note, this Article uses, for the sake of convenience
and simplicity, the terms “Internet” and “cyberspace” as a general
reference to all publicly open infrastructures and services. However, the
scope of this Article is not limited to the “classic” concept of the Internet
since forms of social communication and exchange of content have
dramatically expanded.10
A. The Development of the Internet as a Tool for Free Speech: Early Hope
Versus Current Reality
In 1919, Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court wrote:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by
10. For example, features of cellular devices and communications are not
traditionally conceived as “Internet activity.” The ability to create an application (app)
and make it available to users is one example of a form of speech in cyberspace that also
needs protection.
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free trade in ideas––that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market . . . .11

For years, before the Internet gained its power as a tool for
communication and exchange of information, this notion of the
advancement of speech through the free market of ideas was no more
than a utopian idea that had little resemblance to reality.12 Newspapers,
as well as other mediums of mass media, became big business in markets
that were oligopolistic in nature. High barriers restricted access to
potential competition through promoters of commercial and private
speech.13 High fixed costs drove out competitors or forced them to
consolidate in order to survive.14 As a result, the power to effectively
convey information and opinions to large parts of the public was
reserved to only a few commercial entities with commercial, selfpreserving agendas.15
The emergence of the Internet delivered a promise for a true change
in this picture. This potential for change became more evident as
computers and Internet connectivity became less expensive and more
common among private individuals.16 With the low costs of computers,
an individual could not only be a passive listener, but could also be a
speaker with a variety of tools to deliver content, information, and
opinions to others.17 A speaker could choose to create a website with
minimal or no costs, to express himself in forums, to comment on news
articles, and much more. In addition, as opposed to regular forms of
media, such as print, that are constrained by governmental licensing
demands and accompanying fees, there is no such constraint on Internet

11. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
12. See Stephen C. Jacques, Comment, Reno v. ACLU: Insulating the Internet, the First
Amendment, and the Marketplace of Ideas, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1945, 1955 (1997) (“The
Court thus recognizes that an absolute right to free speech is more of a utopian ideal
than a practical reality.”).
13. Miami Herald Publ’g. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248–50 (1974).
14. See David Carr, The Fissures Are Growing For Papers, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/business/media/newspapers-are-running-out-oftime-to-adapt-to-digital-future.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
15. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 250 (“The result of these vast changes has been to
place in a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape public
opinion.”).
16. Mark J. Perry, Computers Just Keep Getting Cheaper and Better, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www.britannica.com/blogs/2010/04/computersjust-keep-getting-cheaper-and-better-and-we-should-eagerly-await-the-days-ahead/.
17. See Dickerson, supra note 4, at 66. The Internet is a unique invention because it
“allow[s] people to both say what they want to say and hear what they want to hear.” Id.
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speech.18 This new technologically-derived evolution in speech brought
the potential to change the old order where the power to reach large
parts of the public was reserved only to those who possessed sufficient
wealth or political power.19
The Internet originated from an experimental project of the
Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) in 1969, where an internetwork was formed between “computer networks owned by the
military, defense contractors, and university laboratories conducting
defense-related research.”20 Strictly speaking, and for the sake of
accuracy, what is referred to in this Article as “Internet” should be
divided into two distinguishable parts. The Internet, by its technical
definition, is the infrastructure of cyberspace.21 The content that
exploits the infrastructure is the World Wide Web.22 As the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York in In re DoubleClick Inc.
Privacy Litigation explained:
The World Wide Web . . . is often mistakenly referred to as the Internet.
However, the two are quite different. The Internet is the physical
infrastructure of the online world: the servers, computers, fiber-optic
cables and routers through which data is shared online. The Web is
data: a vast collection of documents containing text, visual images, audio
clips and other information . . . . 23

However, in common language, the two are the same. Furthermore,
with the advancement of technology and the various ways of conveying
information through public and semi-public networks,24 a clear
definition of where the physical infrastructure ends and where the world
of content begins becomes vague and obsolete. Therefore, use of the
word “Internet” today is accurate enough, at least for the purposes of this
Article, to describe both the infrastructure and the content that is
distributed upon it.

18. Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1115, 1120 (2005) (“The barriers to entry that exist in other mediums of
expressions, such as traditional print publication and broadcast media, are drastically
reduced in the context of the Internet.”).
19. See id.
20. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
21. In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Various ways of conveying information over the Internet include platforms, such
as messaging programs, apps used in smartphones, and many more.
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“From its inception, the [Internet] was designed to be a
decentralized . . . network[],” with no main single source of connectivity
or access.25 This was not only a technological and logistical feature, but
was also a social view of the new form of media. “Cyberspace arose out
of the academic and research communities and reflects a culture in
which axioms of First Amendment jurisprudence became the dominant
value.”26 This decentralized view had the full potential to accommodate
unprecedented freedom of speech. As John Gilmore said in 1993, “The
Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”27 Twenty
years later, things have changed.
The most recent and extensive advancement in the potential ability
for Internet speakers to deliver content comes from the numerous
different social networking websites—websites whose main function is
user-created content.
Platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube provide users the ability to express themselves and make
expression the backbone of their services.28 The content that a user
provides to these platforms is the main commodity that they use to make
a profit.29
The recent blossom in the use of such social networking websites
and applications creates the strong feeling that free speech is at a
historical peak, at least in the democratic countries of the world. One
can criticize the government, society, and even the platform he is using
to reach a large number of listeners with the technological
accommodation of the website itself. Status updates are being “shared”
and tweets are being “re-tweeted,” reaching users that are far beyond the
close social circle of the speaker.30 The social networks are thought to
have played a critical role in the recent political revolutions of the “Arab
25. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 831.
26. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or SelfRegulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 477 (1997).
27. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME (Dec. 6, 1993), at 62, 64,
available at http://www.chemie.fu-berlin.de/outerspace/internet-article.html.
28. See FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2013); TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2013); YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/
(last visited Sept. 29, 2013).
29. See LJ Rich, How Can Social Networks Make Money?, BBC NEWS (Apr. 15, 2011,
7:44 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/click_online/9457946.stm.
30. See Michael Calia, The First Tweet, Most Tweeted, Most Followed: The Fun Twitter
Facts, THE AUSTRALIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 9:26 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/
business/world/the-first-tweet-most-tweeted-most-followed-the-fun-twitter-facts/storye6frg90o-1226732762393; see generally FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ (last
visited Sept. 29, 2013).
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Spring” in Egypt and in other Arab countries.31 These revolutions were
even dubbed the “Facebook Revolution.”32
However, the perception of the Internet as an ultimate forum for
free speech is far from accurate. Although there is no doubt that the
current state of cyberspace offers opportunities to advance ideas, the
illusion that such opportunities are exploited to the fullest potential is
incorrect. Censorship occurs more often than we like to admit.
For example, Facebook recently suppressed speech when it:
censored an image of Gerhard Richter’s “Ema” from the Pompidou
Center’s Facebook page because it displayed nudity;33 removed a post by
the United States Navy Seals that criticized President Obama for denying
aid to the SEALs in Benghazi prior to the attack on the U.S. embassy;34
and removed photos of female Arab protestors because they appeared
without a head veil.35 Facebook is also being accused of arbitrarily
censoring posts that it deems “irrelevant,” with no further justification or
reason required.36
Apple censored the application (app) “Drone+,” which showed the
geographic locations of the United States military drone strikes in
Pakistan according to unprivileged information that was published in
the media.37 Apple’s reason for censoring the app was that the content

31. Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association: Data Protection
vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1379 (2012).
32. Id.
33. Abigail R. Esman, Facebook’s Censors Strike Again - Is America To Blame?, FORBES
(Aug. 6, 2012, 9:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailesman/2012/08/06/
facebooks-censors-strike-again-is-america-to-blame/. See also Juliette Soulez, Facebook
Censors Pompidou’s Gerhard Richter Nude, Fueling Fight Over “Institutional Puritanism,”
BLOUIN ARTINFO (July 31, 2012), http://www.artinfo.com/news/story/816583/facebookcensors-pompidous-gerhard-richter-nude-fueling-fight-over-institutional-puritanism.
34. Rachel Rickard Straus, Facebook Censors Navy SEALs Who Said Obama Denied
Them Backup As Forces Overran Benghazi And Killed U.S. Ambassador, DAILY MAIL (Oct.
31, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2225667/Facebookcensors-Navy-SEALs-said-Obama-denied-backup-forces-overran-Benghazi-killed-U-SAmbassador.html.
35. Facebook Censors Arab Women, ALJAZEERA, http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/
facebook-censors-arab-women-0022398 (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
36. See, e.g., Colleen Taylor, Is This Censorship? Facebook Stops Users From Posting
‘Irrelevant Or Inappropriate’ Comments, TECHCRUNCH, (May 5, 2012), http://techcrunch.
com/2012/05/05/facebooks-positive-comment-policy-irrelevant-inappropriatecensorship/.
37. Charlie Osborne, Apple Rejects ‘Questionable’ US Drone Strike Tracker App,
SMARTPLANET (Sept. 3, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/smart-takes/
apple-rejects-8216questionable-us-drone-strike-tracker-app/28794.
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was “excessively crude.”38 Apple censored another app that provided
information and news updates about Palestinian protests.39 It refused to
offer for sale an e-book called “Hippie,” which depicted the Hippie
culture and contained nude photos.40 It also censored a dictionary app
called “Ninjawords,” because it contained the ability to look up and find
“objectionable” words.41 In addition, Apple has a habit of censoring
words from the titles of apps, books, and songs on iTunes, such as
“Vagina,” the title of a well-known book by an established author,42 and
“Jailbreak,” a name for installing unapproved apps on Apple devices.43
YouTube also has taken part in its share of censorship, including
censoring the infamous video titled, “The Innocence of Muslims.”44
YouTube was accused of removing for political reasons a satirical proIsraeli video titled, “We Con the World,” which mocked anti-Israel
activists based on the song “We Are the World,” even though YouTube
insisted that it was removed due to a possible copyright infringement.45
YouTube also removed a documentary about a church associated with
Sarah Palin,46 as well as a music video by an alternative rock band

38. Id.
39. Apple Removes ‘Offensive’ Intifada Application, BBC NEWS (June 23, 2011, 8:03
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13890331.
40. Michael Posner, Nudity, E-books and Censorship: How Apple Became Big Brother,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 22, 2012, 10:43 AM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/
books-and-media/nudity-e-books-and-censorship-how-apple-became-bigbrother/article5541912/.
41. Erica Ogg, Apple Censors a Dictionary App, CNET (Aug. 5, 2009, 12:01 PM),
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-10303794-37.html.
42. Meredith Bennett-Smith, Apple iTunes Censors ‘Vagina:’ Feminist Author’s Book
Title Allegedly Considered Explicit, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 13, 2012, 4:52 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/13/apple-itunes-censors-vagina-penisreferences-okay_n_1879197.html.
43. Mario Aguilar, Apple Censors “Jailbreak” In iTunes, GIZMODO (May 17, 2012, 9:52
AM), http://gizmodo.com/5911082/apple-censors-jailbreak-in-itunes.
44. Charlie Osborne, YouTube Censors Controversial Video in the Middle East, ZDNET
(Sept. 13, 2012, 1:09 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/youtube-censors-controversial-videoin-the-middle-east-7000004198/ (“The video has not been removed from YouTube, but
access to it has been blocked in Egypt and Libya.”).
45. Caroline Glick, YouTube Silences Latma, Removes We Con the World,
CAROLINEGLICK.COM (June 12, 2010, 6:01 AM), http://www.carolineglick.com/e/2010/06/
youtube-silences-latma-removes.php.
46. Bruce Wilson, YouTube Censors Documentary on Palin’s Churches, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 13, 2008, 3:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-wilson/youtubecensors-documenta_b_126202.html.
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criticizing Catholicism and the Pope, deeming them both
inappropriate.47
Google has also been accused of restricting free speech by
controlling the content it allows to be published in its sponsored links
section.48 For example, Google removed a political blog writer’s
sponsored link that promoted a book that he wrote that criticized the
Bush Administration about the detainees in Guantánamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib.49 Google removed the sponsored link and informed the writer
that “Google policy does not permit the advertisement of websites that
contain ‘sensitive issues.’”50
The purpose of this short and far from exhaustive list of examples is
not to take a stand as to whether Facebook, YouTube, Apple, and Google
were wrong to exercise censorship in the aforementioned instances. The
objective is to demonstrate that the companies exercise an active policy
of censorship over diverse forms and subjects of expression. It is
unknown whether there is a set of rules that apply in these decisions, the
thought process that the decision is based on, and how much weight, if
any, is given to the advancement of free speech. A look at the terms of
service of different service providers is even more troubling and does not
shed any light on these questions.51 In accordance with the broad legal
immunity granted to ISPs by section 230 of the CDA, most service
providers’ terms of service are either vague in distinguishing the line
between permissible and impermissible content, or the terms are overly
detailed, encompassing a wide range of impermissible materials and
leaving little room for non-conventional speech.52
Facebook states, “We can remove any content or information you
post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement or our
policies.”53 The “Facebook community standards” encompass a long and

47. Lesley Savage, David Bowie’s New Religious-Themed Video Causing Controversy,
CBS NEWS (May 9, 2013, 2:59 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-207_162-57583735/
david-bowies-newest-religious-video-causing-controversy/.
48. Nunziato, supra note 18, at 1123.
49. Id. at 1124.
50. Id.
51. See generally Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2012),
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms; Terms of Service, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms; Internet Services, APPLE, http://www.
apple.com/legal/internet-services/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); Google Terms of Service,
GOOGLE (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/.
52. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
53. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, ¶ 5.2 (Dec. 11, 2012), https://
www.facebook.com/legal/terms.
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detailed list of types of content that will be removed, including,
“promotion or encouragement of self-mutilation, eating disorders or
hard drug abuse,” “[b]ullying and [h]arassment,” “[g]raphic [c]ontent,”
and “[n]udity and [p]ornography.”54 As seen above, Facebook applies
such terms broadly in making a decision to remove content.55
Twitter is no different. It “reserve[s] the right at all times (but will
not have an obligation) to remove or refuse to distribute any Content on
the Services, to suspend or terminate users, and to reclaim usernames
without liability to you.”56 However, Twitter is more limited in its
mandate to censor content, and states that it “will not censor user
content, except in limited circumstances.”57 These limited circumstances
are well-defined and largely based on criminal offenses or torts, such as
impersonation, intellectual property infringement, breach of privacy,
threats, and cybersquatting.58
YouTube, on the other end of the spectrum, is both overbroad and
vague in reserving “the right to decide whether Content violates these
Terms of Service for reasons other than copyright infringement, such as,
but not limited to, pornography, obscenity, or excessive length.”59
Apple, consistent with its image, has an even broader scope of
discretion. It demands that iTunes users not submit materials or apps
that are “obscene, objectionable, or in poor taste,” and “reserves the right
to not post or publish any materials, and to remove or edit any material,
at any time in its sole discretion without notice or liability.”60
The problem is less serious when the censored expressions are more
or less within the boundaries of conventional criticism or expression.
Public opinion is usually a strong enough counter-balance for deterring
service providers from using an “over-happy trigger finger.”61 In the

54. Facebook Community Standards, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
55. See also Mark Gibbs, Bronze Breasts and Facebook Censorship, NETWORKWORLD
(Sept. 26, 2013, 8:51 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/community/blog/bronzebreasts-and-facebook-cenrsorship.
56. Terms of Service, TWITTER, ¶ 8 (June 25, 2012), https://twitter.com/tos.
57. The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-thetwitter-rules (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
58. See id.
59. Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, ¶ 7(B) (June 9, 2010), https://www.youtube.com
/t/terms.
60. See Terms and Conditions, ITUNES (Sept. 18, 2013), www.apple.com/
legal/internet-services/itunes/us/gifts.html.
61. See, e.g., Erik Wemple, Facebook Admits Error in Censoring Anti-Obama Message,
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
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aforementioned examples, the act of censorship was exposed, criticized,
and in some cases, the service provider apologized and made amends.62
The real danger occurs when the most important forms of speech are
censored—the speech that actually needs the most stringent protection.
This includes the unpopular speech, the eccentric and quirky speech,
and the inflammatory speech—the speech that no one fights for or
writes about––the speech that leaves no trace of existence after it has
been removed.
Another troubling problem with private censorship is the lack of
transparency regarding the selection and the volume of the content that
is being censored.63 There are ample statistics detailing government
efforts to censor content on the Internet, and service providers generally
are happy to present such data.64 However, despite vigorous attempts to
find statistics on content removal rates made by the private entities
themselves (i.e., Facebook, YouTube, and other service providers), such
attempts prove unsuccessful, including direct requests made for the
purpose of this Article.65 The absence of transparency and accessibility
of data, with the partial exception of Google, is in itself part of the
hazard of private censorship and will be elaborated further in Part E of
this Article.66
blogs/erik-wemple/post/facebook-admits-error-in-censoring-anti-obama-message/
2012/10/31/d6063c22-235e-11e2-ac85-e669876c6a24_blog.html.
62. See id. A Facebook spokesperson acknowledged its mistake and stated, “This
was an error and we apologize for any inconvenience it may have caused. They can feel
free to repost the image.” Id.
63. See David Badash, Has Facebook Censorship Gone Too Far?, THE NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Nov. 7, 2011), http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/has-facebookcensorship-gone-too-far/politics/2011/11/07/29714 (“Yet what [Facebook] chooses to
censor and to not censor apparently is subject to some deeply held secretive algorithm.”).
64. Google offers semi-annual data reports revealing government and copyright
owners’ requests to remove content. It also provides statistics regarding how often
Google complies with such requests. See Transparency Report, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/ (last visited Nov. 5,
2013). Beginning around July 2011 to January 2013, various government agencies have
requested that roughly 4,000 items be removed every six months. Id. Compliance rates
by Google have decreased, however, from sixty-three percent as of July 2011 to forty-five
percent in January 2013. Id.
65. A request made to Google for data regarding video removal rates on YouTube
was answered laconically with: “Thanks for contacting Google. I’m afraid we’re not able
to meet this request at this time.” No further explanation was provided. Requests to
other service providers went unanswered as well.
66. See generally Betsy Isaacson, 55 Charts That Prove Governments Are Increasingly
Censoring Your Internet, HUFFINGTON POST (July 3, 2013, 1:01 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/03/government-censor-internet_n_3535322.html
(“Since
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B. The Misconception of the Free Market’s Ability to Protect Free Speech
Rights
Section 230 is based on interests in accommodating a free Internet
market.67 This is confirmed by Congress’s findings that “[t]he Internet
and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity
of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development,
and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”68 Furthermore, Congress
found that “[i]ncreasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for
a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”69
In addition, “[i]t is the policy of the United States . . . to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation.”70 Thus, under the “Good Samaritan” protection, service
providers are offered double immunity—immunity from liability for
publications made through their infrastructure or service, and immunity
from liability for removal of content.71
Congress’s view, reflected in section 230, ignores the major
differences between the real world and cyberspace, as well as the central
role that cyberspace plays in our daily lives. In many ways, cyberspace
replaced the traditional ways that society was accustomed to exchanging
information and opinions.72 Section 230 demonstrates Congress’s
disregard for these fundamental differences.73
The first characteristic of cyberspace that differs from the real world
is the absence of “sidewalks” in cyberspace. In the real world, a person
can walk out of his front door and start wandering through the streets.
Streets are public property and can connect this person to other people’s
homes, department stores, services, and more. This person can meet
other people on the sidewalk as well. People may approach this person
to start a conversation. He may hand out pamphlets, hold signs, or
speak aloud about something that bothers him. Even if this person is

2009, Google has been lauded for publishing ‘transparency reports’ on government
requests to take information offline.”).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 230(a)(5).
70. Id. § 230(b)(2).
71. Id. § 230(c).
72. See Nick Morgan, How Digital Technology Has Changed Communication – First of
Three Posts, FORBES (May 21, 2013, 11:54 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nickmorgan/
2013/05/21/how-digital-technology-has-changed-communication-first-of-three-posts/.
73. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
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walking around aimlessly, he still needs to navigate through the public
space if he wants to move from one private sphere to another. This
person is free to take different routes as he chooses. In other words,
“[t]he constitutional guarantee that citizens have access to public streets,
sidewalks, and parks in order to speak and assemble has been and
remains of paramount importance to the existence of a free and vibrant
democratic culture in this country.”74 In a public forum, speakers can
make themselves available and achieve exposure to large audiences at no
cost and without any restrictions.75 For example:
Public forums provide tangible places in which the promise of the First
Amendment can be made real. Free speech and assembly serve
important ends of individual liberty of expression, the free exchange of
information and opinion on which the institutions of civil society rely,
and the promotion of the open debate among political equals upon
which a thriving democracy depends.76

Cyberspace is entirely different. Although cyberspace may create an
illusion that a user has complete freedom and discretion to explore
websites and information on the Internet, this is a misconception.77 In
cyberspace, there are only two ways for a user to reach a website: either
he knows the exact web address of the website he wants to visit, or he
can choose from the links offered by the search engine that he is using.78
A website that does not fall within one of these two options does not
exist for that particular user at that moment. A metaphoric comparison
of cyberspace and the real world illustrates the lack of options that a user
faces in cyberspace.79 For example, suppose that cyberspace is a large
building made out of infinite rooms, where each room is connected to
other rooms through direct doors and passages, but there is no common
corridor that one can walk through to directly access the individual
rooms. Search engines, such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo, may seem to
resemble “corridors.” In reality, they are no different than any other
“rooms,” except for the amount of doors they offer and their claim that
they connect to all other rooms.80 Yet, the search engines are private
entities, and as seen above, this claim that they connect to all other

74. Noah D. Zatz, Note, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in
the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 151 (1998).
75. Id. at 161.
76. Id. at 160.
77. See id. at 173.
78. See id. at 185−86.
79. See id. at 187–88.
80. See id. at 207–08.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2013

13

5. IDISIS_FINAL

1/17/2014 6:04 PM

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 5

160

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:147

rooms is not entirely accurate.81 The assumption that competition is a
strong enough incentive for private actors in cyberspace to create betterbalanced content regulation regimes should be carefully reexamined
since the availability of content on the Internet is protected only by
goodwill and commercial interests.82
The classic capitalistic view that is transposed to cyberspace
maintains that by minimizing government involvement in the market, it
will further competition in the “free-speech enabling” market, allowing
the consumer-user to choose the platforms, websites, and search engines
that least restrict user content.83 Additionally, even if the mainstream
service providers prefer to offer a more “consensual” product, other
service providers will recognize the demand for a different product and
will provide it. One professor noted:
It does not matter whether online discussion groups or even entire
networks of such groups are internally autocratic, since individuals can
always choose “their own more congenial online homes.” . . . It is the
ease of exit and the abundance of alternatives—in essence consumer
choice in conditions approaching perfect competition—that bring to
fruition the liberal ideals of liberty and consent.84

However, this view has some inherent flaws. First, the free market
notion holds a fundamental dissonance to the idea of freedom of
speech.85 “[T]he free market system necessarily fails because the values
embodied in the First Amendment are not meant to reflect an aggregate
of existing private preferences, but instead are meant to incorporate a set of
collective values, which an unregulated market will not necessarily
recognize.”86
Second, the reality is that cyberspace has become more
commercialized and more centralized over the years. This trend of
increased commercialization and centralization of the Internet was
accurately predicted by Professor Neil Weinstock Netanel:

81. See id. at 208.
82. Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on Government Regulation to
Preserve the Internet’s Unregulated Character, 85 MINN. L. REV. 215, 270 (2000).
83. Id. at 287–91.
84. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 404–05 (2000) (quoting David R.
Johnson & David G. Post, The New “Civic Virtue” of the Internet, in THE EMERGING
INTERNET 23 (1998 Annual Review of the Institute for Information Studies) (C.
Firestone, ed. 1998)).
85. See Dickerson, supra note 4, at 86; see also Johnson & Post, supra note 84.
86. Dickerson, supra note 4, at 86.
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Lone authors and musicians might still post their work on listservs and
web sites, and those who know and care to look will still be able to read
and hear that work. But the dissemination of most information and
expression will more closely resemble today’s mass media marketplace
than today’s infant Internet. Both authors and audiences will return to
depend heavily on intermediaries—the cyberspace equivalents of book
publishers, film studios, newspapers, television networks, and record
producers—to act as gatekeepers selecting which expression to market,
to market that expression, and to invest in the production of expensive
content. Those intermediaries will determine what content gets
communicated to most people.87

For example, it is estimated that Apple’s iOS has control of
approximately 34.3% of the mobile operating systems in the United
States,88 Google has approximately sixty-seven percent of the market
share in search engines,89 and Google’s video streaming sites—mainly
YouTube—has 152 million unique viewers out of a total of 182 million
unique viewers.90 Additionally, it is estimated that Facebook holds
approximately fifty-nine percent of the social network market in the
United States.91 Instead of creating a diversified market, the competition
for users has caused the opposite to occur. For instance:
Emerging Internet technology fuels rule regime centralization by
effectively raising cyberspace market entry costs. In a world awash in
cheap information, audience attention becomes a scarce and highly
sought-after resource. Not surprisingly, then, commercial players
compete vociferously to draw Internet users to their portals and web
sites, and to keep users there as long as possible. As in the offline world,
producers with the financial resources to market their products, exploit
synergies with corporate partners and affiliates, and produce high-

87. Netanel, supra note 84, at 463–64.
88. ComScore Reports November 2012 U.S. Mobile Subscriber Market Share, COMSCORE
(Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2013/1/comScore_
Reports_November_2012_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share.
89. ComScore Releases November 2012 U.S. Search Engine Rankings, COMSCORE (Dec.
12,
2012),
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/12/comScore_
Releases_November_2012_U.S._Search_Engine_Rankings.
90. ComScore Releases November 2012 U.S. Online Video Rankings, COMSCORE (Dec.
18,
2012),
http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2012/12/comScore_
Releases_November_2012_U.S._Online_Video_Rankings.
91. Priit Kallas, Top 10 Social Networking Sites by Market Share of Visits [November
2012], DREAMGROW (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.dreamgrow.com/top-10-socialnetworking-sites-by-market-share-of-visits-november-2012/.
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quality, attention-grabbing content will likely succeed in capturing the
lion’s share of audience attention.92

The trend towards centralization is even more worrisome considering
the fact that speech, trading views, and opinions on cyberspace do not
merely coexist alongside the traditional ways of expression in the real
world. Instead, cyberspace speech is beginning to replace traditional
forms of expression.93 This troubling trend of centralization combined
with the public’s misconception about free speech in cyberspace creates
a tangible danger that unpopular and controversial speech will fall
between the cracks and disappear without anyone even noticing.94
There is no reason to trust that commercial entities will want to, or
even know how to, make a balanced, good faith determination of
whether content is “obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable,” as section 230 suggests.95
Commercial companies are inherently biased, primarily focusing on
maximizing profits, which is generally achieved by reaching the broadest
client base and by keeping content as consensual and non-provocative as
possible.96 Thus, the “good faith” restriction offered by section 230 is
futile; it is ambiguous and fails to offer any standards for a court to
consider in distinguishing conduct that was performed in “good faith”
and conduct that was not.97 For example, is a decision to reject
unpopular speech, based purely on commercial interests, considered to
be made in good faith? Furthermore, an evidentiary obstacle renders the
good faith restriction completely useless because a commercial entity is
not required to provide the reasoning for its decision.98 Therefore,
under section 230, conduct cannot be judicially scrutinized based on a
lack of good faith.99 In other words, only “smoking guns” are capable of
proving the existence of bad faith, and smoking guns are hard to
discover.
As demonstrated by the limited number of cases that have
addressed immunity under section 230(c)(2)(A), courts have been

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Netanel, supra note 84, at 441–42.
See id. at 415–16.
See Dickerson, supra note 4, at 86–87.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012).
See Nachbar, supra note 82, at 303–05; see also Netanel, supra note 84, at 441–

42.
97. Dickerson, supra note 4, at 82 (noting that “the laundry list of adjectives
describing the type of content that may be restricted” creates a potential for abuse).
98. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see also Dickerson, supra note 4, at 82–83.
99. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see also Dickerson, supra note 4, at 81–82.
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unwilling to recognize bad faith unless there was clear evidence of an
impure motive, such as extortion.100 Such an impure motive was
presented in Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards In Electronic
Transactions, Inc.101 There, the plaintiff-user alleged that the service
provider would only stop blocking his e-mails if he would purchase a
service package from the provider.102 The U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss a claim
based on section 230(c)(2)(A) partly because the defendant “ha[d] not
produced anything to show that it in fact acted in good faith.”103 In
contrast, in Levitt v. Yelp!, Inc. the plaintiff-customer alleged that Yelp
removed positive reviews from its website because the plaintiff refused
to buy advertisement services from Yelp.104 The U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California dismissed the claim, stating that the
plaintiff “fails to plausibly allege that any of Yelp’s conduct amounted to
an implied extortionate threat,”105 and that “[i]nferring an implied
extortionate threat from the removal of these positive reviews is
particularly inappropriate.”106 The court explained that the mere
proximity between the customer’s refusal to purchase advertising and
the removal of the positive reviews by Yelp did not constitute sufficient
evidence to support bad faith.107 Similarly, in Holomaxx Technologies v.
Yahoo!, Inc. the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California also refused to find a showing of bad faith after determining
that the plaintiff failed to “identify an objective industry standard that
Yahoo! fail[ed] to meet.”108 The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that
Yahoo had an obligation to “discuss in detail the particular reasons for
blocking” advertisement e-mails as part of the “good faith” prong.109
Consequently, the requirement under section 230 that commercial
100. See Smith v. Trusted Universal Stds. in Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. 09-4567
(RBK/KMW), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43360, at *16–20 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010); Levitt v.
Yelp! Inc., No. C 10-1321 MHP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99372, at *35 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22,
2011).
101. Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43360, at *20–21.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *21 (noting that “Comcast was not concerned that people were receiving
large quantities of emails, or concerned about the content of the emails, but rather was
concerned that Plaintiff had not purchased a sufficient level of service”).
104. Levitt, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99372, at *35–36.
105. Id. at *36.
106. Id. at *38.
107. Id. at *36–37.
108. Holomaxx Techs. v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. CV-10-4926-JF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30819, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011).
109. Id. at *13–14.
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entities act in “good faith” when deciding whether to remove content has
led to inconsistent decisions in the courts and further demonstrates
Congress’s inability to effectively regulate content on the Internet.
C.

Is There a Need for Private Censorship, or Censorship at all?

Irrespective of cyber speech regulation, preventing certain forms of
ex-ante speech from reaching the public is nothing new.110 These types
of speech may be censored for numerous reasons, including: danger to
national security, defamation, invasion of privacy, incitement to
violence, intellectual property infringement, and more.111
The
introduction of the Internet into our lives has only reinforced the need
for ex-ante prevention against harmful content.112 However, for a
number of reasons, the traditional enforcement mechanisms are illequipped to effectively regulate the Internet.
First, the Internet, as an open and inexpensive medium, allows a
user to disseminate content with very low costs.113 In addition to low
costs, the fact that “distance is measured in nanoseconds,” and
dissemination of information to mass audiences is only a click away,
means that the number of “speakers” in cyberspace is potentially as large
as the number of active users.114 This also means that many of the
“speakers” are not “professionals” or commercial entities with an internal
checks-and-balances system. Rather, the speakers are private individuals
who, even if they do not possess sinister intentions, are sometimes
unaware of the implications of their actions and generally do not obtain
legal consultation before they act or “speak.” This has the potential to
lead to harmful expressions, amplified not only by the large number of
speakers in general, but also by the speakers’ lack of knowledge on what
110. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726–27 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that
publication must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event
kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the
issuance of an interim restraining order.”).
111. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (protecting copyrighted works
through the extension of existing and future copyrights); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (holding that a State may forbid advocacy that “is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”); Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (noting “the protection even as to
previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited” but is “recognized only in exceptional
cases”).
112. See Dickerson, supra note 4, at 67–68.
113. See id. at 64–65.
114. Gibbons, supra note 26, at 502.
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constitutes harmful content, and by the ease of republication of the
information.115
Second, the Internet, more than any other medium, enables
speakers to reach millions of users.116 The theoretical potential for
exposure is almost limitless. A speaker could conceivably reach the total
number of people that use the Internet. Furthermore, users who do not
actively search for and do not intend to be exposed to harmful
expression may nonetheless be involuntarily exposed to such harmful
expression.117
Third, once the harmful expression is “out in the open,” it is
difficult to take effective measures to eliminate traces of such harmful
expression.118 Books, newspapers, and magazines can be taken off of the
shelves. Television shows or movies can be archived and not shown
again. In the above examples, a person who is interested in making a
copy must invest certain efforts and resources to actually obtain that
copy. However, the Internet is different—making a copy of a file or
taking a “screenshot” has virtually no cost and only involves a click of
the mouse. Moreover, once one copy exists, it can be redistributed with
the same ease.119
These are only a few reasons why the traditional enforcement
system faces hardships in efficiently controlling Internet content. In
addition, legal proceedings take time. Even just one day may be a
lifetime in cyberspace time. In cases where the content can indeed cause
harm, immediate action is required. However, such action can only be
effective if it is taken by one who has authority, without the obstruction
created by intermediaries, such as courts.
Private regulation is preferable over government regulation because
of the infrastructure available to service providers for monitoring the
Internet. Through a combination of technological measures and services
to aid users in reporting inappropriate content, service providers can
effectively monitor the web, whereas the government must passively
wait for complaints to be filed or must create an external array of
monitoring. Also, it is difficult to imagine how one government entity
can effectively replace the monitoring function of hundreds or
thousands of website operators and other service providers. In addition,
it is important to consider the negative political implications that would
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 485–86; Dickerson, supra note 4, at 99.
Dickerson, supra note 4, at 64–65.
See id. at 74–75.
Gibbons, supra note 26, at 482.
See id.
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arise if the government appeared to encourage “whistleblowing” based
on people speaking their minds on the Internet.
D. The Search for a Better Balance Between the Competing Interests
Since private censorship is here to stay, a solution must be found
that maintains the benefits of private regulation while minimizing its
adverse effects. Academic writers have suggested various approaches
The
and doctrines for applying appropriate public standards.120
underlying argument common to all of these approaches is the view that
the First Amendment encompasses an affirmative, active duty on the
government not only to refrain from interfering with free speech, but
also to insure that private actors do not illegitimately interfere with free
speech.121
A derivative of this approach is the public forum doctrine.122 This
doctrine imposes an affirmative obligation on the government “to
dedicate certain publicly-held property for the use and benefit of
individuals” to exercise their right of free speech.123 Additionally,
through the state action doctrine, courts can deem a private entity a
public forum, and thus, subject it to First Amendment constitutional
restraints.124 One such theory for applying this doctrine is when a
private actor fulfills a function that is traditionally within the scope of
the responsibility of the state.125 In accordance with this theory, it was
plainly argued that courts should apply First Amendment values to
private speech regulation since service providers offer a service with

120. See Nunziato, supra note 18, at 1143. Under the Net libertarian view, “if there
are low barriers to entry in the speech market, then the speech-protective goals of the
First Amendment will be perfectly advanced by the aggregation of private forums and
private speech decisions within these forums. Affirmative government involvement in
the market for speech . . . [is] unnecessary.” Id. However, “[t]he affirmative conception
of the First Amendment requires the government’s involvement in the market for free
speech to establish conditions allowing each citizen to exercise meaningfully his or her
right to freedom of expression, a right that is integral to our system of democratic selfgovernment.” Id. at 1144.
121. Id.; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 18–
19 (Free Press 1st ed. 1995).
122. Nunziato, supra note 18, at 1144.
123. Id.
124. Dickerson, supra note 4, at 84.
125. Id.
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public attributes, described as “one great public forum for individuals to
express themselves.”126
Similar arguments were raised and rejected by the courts.127 A
representative example reflecting the attitude of courts regarding
attempts to enforce First Amendment duties on Internet service
providers can be found in Langdon v. Google, Inc.128 There, the plaintiff
filed an action against Google and other search engines after they refused
to post his advertisements that promoted websites that criticize China.129
The plaintiff argued, “[I]nternet search engines are public forums, and
that private property opened to the public may be subject to the First
Amendment.”130 Furthermore, the plaintiff “compare[d] [I]nternet
search engines to malls and/or shopping centers and contend[ed] that
Google has dedicated its private property as a public forum.”131 The U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed the claim with very
little discussion, stating:
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim that Defendants violated his First
Amendment right to free speech. Defendants are private, for profit
companies, not subject to constitutional free speech guarantees. They
are [I]nternet search engines that use the [I]nternet as a medium to
conduct business . . . .
Plaintiff’s analogy of Defendants’ private networks to shopping
centers and his position that since they are open to the public they
become public forums is not supported by case law. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that a private shopping center is not a public forum
for speech purposes. The Court has routinely rejected the assumption

126. See Nunziato, supra note 18, at 1170–71 (noting that service providers “have
become essentially immune from scrutiny under the First Amendment”).
127. Hudgens v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976) (holding union
members do not have First Amendment rights to enter a mall to engage in picketing of a
store inside); Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (holding private
property does not “lose its private character merely because the public is generally
invited to use it”); Nat’l A-1 Adver., Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 156,
167–69 (D.N.H. 2000) (holding that “mere performance” of a public function, by itself, is
insufficient to qualify an entity as a state actor); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. American
Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding “in the absence of State
action, the private online service has the right to prevent unsolicited e-mail solicitations
from reaching its subscribers over the Internet”).
128. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626 (D. Del. 2007).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 631.
131. Id.
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that people who want to express their views in a private facility, such as
a shopping center, have a constitutional right to do so.132

The court gave little weight to the fact that in the analogy, Google is
more than a regular shopping mall. Google is a shopping mall in a
world where there are no public sidewalks. To be more accurate, Google
owns most of the sidewalks, and the sidewalks themselves are the
shopping mall.
Additionally, the court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s claim of
lack of alternatives, stating, “the Court finds unavailing Plaintiff’s
argument that he has no reasonable alternative to advertising on
Defendants’ search engines.”133 The court failed to recognize the realities
of the situation and the impact that its decision would have on free
speech. First, the court ignored the distinction between the effectiveness
of cyberspace and the “real world.”134 Second, it glossed over the fact
that private entities control most, if not all alternatives, and there is no
similarly effective alternative to what Google offers.135 The Internet is a
resource for exposure that stands high above all other resources in its
ability to quickly reach masses of audiences.136 If a person is allowed to
speak in a rally, but is forbidden to use a megaphone, it is hard to say
that he has a way of exercising his right of free speech to the fullest
extent. Denying an available resource that magnifies free speech and
that is unique in its effectiveness is no different than any other
restriction on free speech.
While one can criticize the rhetoric of the courts, rejecting First
Amendment claims against private ISPs is the only option available for
courts without striking parts of section 230.137 Allowing a First
Amendment claim in these instances would render the protection
granted by Congress ineffective.138 The result is that plaintiffs are
granted free reign to raise claims wherever they see fit, and private
companies are entangled in lengthy court proceedings attempting to
determine if users’ First Amendment rights were even harmed. This
132. Id. at 631–32 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 632 (citing Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. American Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp.
436, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that a “private company had numerous alternatives for
reaching customers including mail, television, cable, newspaper, magazines, and
competing commercial online services”)).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. The World in 2013: ICT Facts and Figures, INT’L TELECOMM. UNION (Feb. 2013),
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2013.pdf.
137. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
138. See id. § 230(c).
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undoubtedly results in a chilling effect on private content regulation,
which, as mentioned above, is a positive mechanism when applied with
reasonableness and proportionality.139
A more direct approach has also been suggested. Instead of courts
overriding section 230, Congress “should mandate that [Internet Service
Providers] provide access no more narrowly than the First Amendment
would permit if the Internet were owned and operated by the
government.”140 Whether it is through the courts or Congress itself, the
approach suggested would erase the distinction between private service
providers and the government.141 However, this approach ignores the
inherent differences between the state and the private market, which in
turn creates great difficulties for service providers and for free speech
itself.
As mentioned above, an effective and well-balanced private
regulation of speech must be incentivized since enabling First
Amendment claims against private actors will likely create a chilling
effect on their willingness to regulate content.142 If private actors, or
ISPs, abstained from regulating or censoring content when they should
have, Congress would have to remove ISPs’ immunity in order to avoid
the undesirable result of under-regulation. Yet, removal of such
immunity would result in increased legal costs for the private market.143
In turn, freedom of speech would be harmed in at least two possible
ways: service providers would try to indemnify themselves ex-ante for
the extra costs in order to refrain from losing revenues, and the Internet
would be less accessible to users who have fewer financial resources.144
The extra cost would result in adverse selection, i.e., it would raise
market entry barriers so both new and small alternative competitors
would be driven out of the market or forced to merge with others,
leaving the market even more centralized than it is now.145

139. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
140. Dickerson, supra note 4, at 97.
141. See id.
142. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text.
143. CDA Section 230 & Immunity for Online Intermediaries, TECHFREEDOM (July 3,
2013), http://techfreedom.org/post/58448917562/cda-section-230-immunity-for-onlineintermediaries.
144. Id.
145. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict
Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 520 (2001) (noting that imposing liability on
private entities in other contexts results in costly ex post adjudication).
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E. An Offer of Solution
In order to ensure an appropriate balance between the competing
interests, the proposed solution must have several features that
overcome the faults of the current private regulation regime. In order to
do that, we must first recognize what is missing in the current regulation
regarding ISPs’ conduct.
1.

Need for an Ethical Code of Conduct

Journalists, or the “old world” gatekeepers of democracy and
advocates of free speech, have had ethical codes of conduct since the
early twentieth century that direct, among other things, the balance
between advancement of information through free speech with other
interests.146 Although Google has a code of conduct and is renowned for
its “[d]on’t be evil” mantra, it can hardly be considered a real ethical
code.147 In general, it is an anomaly that these private actors that have at
least the same power and social responsibility as journalists do not have
an ethical code. Therefore, a clear and coherent set of norms must be
created. In order to promote obedience, uniformity, and objectivity, the
code must be a product of cooperation between all of the different
players, rather than merely coming from within the ISPs themselves.
2.

A Non-legal Option for Appealing Censorship Decisions

An ethical code is a powerless solution if there is not an external
review system that is available to verify implication of the code in
specific instances. In addition, there needs to be a remedial route
available for those who were harmed by the removal of content. This
route must comply with the needs illustrated above that are derivative
from the character of the Internet. In order to be effective, it must be
quick and simple. The remedial route also has to be inexpensive, both
for the ISP involved, in order to avoid the adverse effects mentioned
above, and for the complainant, in order to encourage complaints.148
For all of those reasons, the procedure must be non-legal, must avoid the
use of lawyers, and must be limited only to the decision of whether or

146. See Robert J. Sheran & Barbara S. Isaacman, Do We Want a Responsible Press?: A
Call for the Creation of Self-Regulatory Mechanisms, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 96–97
(1982).
147. Code of Conduct, GOOGLE (Apr. 25, 2012), http://investor.google.com/corporate/
code-of-conduct.html.
148. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
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not the removed content will be restored. That way, the full monetary
immunity granted to ISPs under section 230 may remain.149
3.

Transparency

As mentioned above, the lack of transparency is an existing problem
with the current regime.150 ISPs have no obligation to provide notice or
an explanation for their censorship decisions.151 Lack of such obligation
promotes arbitrariness and bad faith. It also makes it nearly impossible
to exercise any scrutiny over the decision. Therefore, with the new
regulation, ISPs must be obligated to provide notice to the user, as well
as a short explanation or reason for its decision.
4.

Removal of National Barriers

As one scholar noted:
Trying to regulate cyberspace on a country-by-country basis is doomed
to fail because it is inefficient and does not account for the inherent
nature of the technology. “The Internet is wholly insensitive to
geographic distinctions. In almost every case, users of the Internet
neither know nor care about the physical location of the Internet
resources they access.”152

Although a non-legal set of ethical norms would not be able to replace
pre-existing local legislation, such a code would help bridge different
cultural conceptions of speech and assist in promoting the free exchange
of information and opinions. If the dissemination of the ethical norms
proves effective, it would provide an opportunity to influence countries
with strict legal regimes and to make them consider loosening their legal
scrutiny over speech, leaving it to a global form of non-legal regulation.
After exposing the necessary corrections that need to be made to
the existing regulation, the question is how these changes should be
implemented. The best option for achieving these goals is in a
coordinated manner through one source of authority. This idea of
establishing an alternative form of governance, a “cyber-governance” if
you will, has already been presented in different contexts by academic

149. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
150. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.
152. Gibbons, supra note 26, at 502 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F.
Supp. 160, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
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scholars.153 In addition, this suggestion is not just a theoretical idea. It
is already implemented in the field of Internet domain names by the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a
private, representative body that is responsible for the creation and
implementation of domain name rules and their applications in specific
disputes.154 Although ICANN was harshly criticized for flaws in its
conception, form of governance, and legitimacy, it proves that the idea
of a privatized, global institute that regulates different aspects of the
Internet is both realistic and feasible.155
The proposed institute could be a private initiative composed of the
main players in the field, such as Google and Yahoo, that would be
willing to “pick up the glove.”156 Alternatively, it could be introduced
and established by an international treaty that would also mandate state
legislation that conditions ISPs’ immunity from liability, as in section
230, on joining the international body.157 This organization would
provide the ethical code and would also have a dispute resolution
section that would deal with individual complaints. Such complaints
could be easily filed online, with payment of a symbolic filing fee. The
establishment of this organization would also help overcome problems
of transparency since all members would be obliged to report their
censorship decisions. It would then publish its resolutions and
153. See Netanel, supra note 84, at 482–83; see also Gibbons, supra note 26, at 506–
07.
154. Welcome to ICANN!, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/about/welcome (last
visited Nov. 4, 2013).
155. See John Palfrey, The End of the Experiment: How ICANN’s Foray into Global
Internet Democracy Failed, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 409, 410–16 (2004); Jonathan
Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy, 50 DUKE L.J. 187, 209–17 (2000).
156. Although at first glance it may sound strange that private entities will
independently undertake such an obligation, it is not so far-fetched. Many large
companies are waging a public relations battle over their public image. See Erik
Sherman, Google is Worried About its Public Image when it Wants All Information, CBS
MONEY WATCH (Jan. 15, 2010, 7:47 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_16243442322/google-is-worried-about-its-public-image-when-it-wants-all-information/.
Facebook and Google are investing numerous resources in assuring users of their good
intentions in guarding users’ interests. See Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK (Dec. 11, 2012),
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy; Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (June 24, 2013),
http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/. If one of the major players would create such
an initiative, it could result in a “snow-ball” effect, where every service provider that is
unwilling to join would suffer harm to its reputation.
157. Conditioning immunity upon joining the organization could be imposed only on
service providers beyond a specific size in order to prevent over-burdening smaller
providers. Such size limit could be determined by a predefined user-number limit or by
a predefined market-share limit.
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periodical reports, thus creating an incentive for ISPs not to overregulate. Since it would be a non-governmental, international body, it
would also help mitigate the international gaps.
CONCLUSION
The notion that cyberspace is an ultimate promoter of free speech is
far from being accurate. In reality, the nature of the free market along
with the legislative immunity granted to ISPs by Congress fails to create
proper incentives for ISPs to maintain a proper balance between free
speech and other interests. As a result, these providers engage in overregulation of speech. On the other hand, the idea of un-regulated
content on the Internet is unrealistic. Different suggestions to correct
the current state of the law have been made, but they aim at setting
protection of First Amendment rights on the private market, a
suggestion that carries with it adverse effects both on the market and on
the interest of free speech. Therefore, another solution must be found—
a solution that maintains proper protection of free speech while
minimizing the adverse effects of restrictions on the prerogative to
regulate content.
Such solution is found in the establishment of a non-governmental,
representative organization that would create an ethical code of content
regulation through the consensus of its members. This organization
would effectively and efficiently resolve disputes arising out of
censorship acts that are claimed to be contrary to the ethical code. Such
a solution would finally bring the Internet in line with what it was meant
to be—the most powerful tool for the advancement of free speech and
social change ever created so far.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2013

27

